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IS THE RECOVERY SUSTAINABLE?
 . ,  , and  
Fiscal austerity is now a worldwide phenomenon. The United States and many other countries
are essentially importing fiscal austerity from troubled economies in Europe and elsewhere. This
is one way of looking at the predicament posed by the current world growth slowdown, which
has developed during America’s weak recovery from the 2007–09 recession. Following the finan-
cial collapse of perhaps four countries in Western Europe, US companies will not find much
demand for their products abroad, since few of the affected countries will be able to implement
appropriate stimulus measures within a year. Rather, countries such as Greece, Portugal, and
Ireland are being forced to implement austerity measures as a condition for receiving interna-
tional loans and bailouts, and some staggering giants such as the United Kingdom, Spain, and
Italy are making deep budget cuts of their own. 
Unfortunately, even before the collapse of the Greek and Italian governments, and the deba-
cle in the relatively large Italian bond market, forecasters were predicting weak economic growth
in most of the world in the coming months and years. Figure 1 corresponds to International
Monetary Fund (IMF) growth-rate forecasts for this year and next for some of the largest nations,
certain economic blocs, and the world. The 2011 forecast for the eurozone is less than 2 percent—
among the worst of the forecasts depicted in the figure—and the IMF expects the region to expe-
rience even slower growth of 1.1 percent next year (the European Union’s own forecast for its
member countries is a grimmer 0.6 percent [Dalton 2011]). Overall, the advanced economies will
grow at a 1.9 percent annual rate next year, according to the IMF numbers. 
Although the IMF expects a modest uptick in growth rates for many countries in 2012, the
important point is that many of the largest countries are already in an abysmal slump, even as the
euro debt crisis intensifies and spreads. Moreover, as seen in the figure, even the economies of the
developing world, which grew the most quickly last year, are expected to slow down at least mod-
estly in 2012. Finally, some more recent forecasts are even less optimistic. In new figures released
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Institutelate last month, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development projected economic growth in the euro-
zone at 1.6 percent in 2011 and 0.2 percent in 2012 (OECD
2011). All official forecasters seem to recognize, if belatedly,
the implications of the deepening European fiscal crisis and
related economic problems around the world.
Growth abroad is helpful to faltering economies, so the
international slowdown documented by these forecasts is very
unfavorable for the outlook of policymakers at the national
level. In these conditions, it will be hard for the United States
to turn a huge trade deficit into even a moderate one without
transforming  US  industry  into  an  export  leader,  as  Japan,
Korea, and other Asian nations did in the last half of the 20th
century. This kind of industrialization has been a rare feat in
world economic history, and it is unlikely that more than a
handful of countries will follow in the footsteps of Japan and
other  export-oriented,  late-developing  economies.  To  the
extent that more countries adopt an export-led growth strat-
egy, they may accomplish little more than drawing a small num-
ber of scarce customers away from other exporting nations,
which will also be counting on exports to lead domesticgrowth.
IMF figures support this point of view. 
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Figure 2 shows the current account balances for all trading
nations and economic “blocs” over the period 2000–16. The
bars below the horizontal line correspond to deficits; the bars
above the line represent surplus countries and blocs. Since the
deficits and surpluses of all countries add up to zero, the stack
of bars above the line is equal in length to the stack beneath it.
The gray bars, which depict US deficits for all the years shown
in  the  figure,  shrank  markedly  during  the  recession  of
2007–09; last year, the deficit once again began increasing. The
IMF predicts a further reduction in the US current account
deficit through 2013, followed by a renewed expansion of this
drain on demand for US products beginning the following
year. Through 2014, the US deficit is expected to fall from
$468 billion to $273 billion. This would amount to a reduc-
tion in the current account deficit of $194 billion, or about 1.3
percent of the approximate US GDP of $15 trillion. The cur-
rent shortfall in aggregate demand from the private, public,
and foreign sectors combined is far larger than this. The US
Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates that GDP was 6.8 per-
cent below its potential level in the third quarter of this year
(St. Louis Fed 2011).
While the IMF expects a lesser role for export-led growth
in  China  and  Germany,  it  also  expects  other  countries  in
Figure 1 IMF Annual Real GDP Growth Forecasts 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook database
2011
2012












9 8 7 5 6 10
Percent
Figure 2 Current Account Balances


































2014 2012 2004 2000 2002 2016 2010 2006 2008emerging Asia to rely on exports for growth, so that the over-
all level of global imbalances stabilizes. (Recent figures suggest
that the IMF may have actually underestimated the pace of
export growth in Germany, as that country is expected by
some observers to set all-time records for export volumes in
2011; see Parkin 2011). As implied in the chart, this would
require  nations  in  the “rest  of  the  world”  to  be  willing  to
absorb Asian imports by running a current account deficit.
Since it is hard to believe that other developing countries would
be able to sustain domestic growth with an external deficit on
this scale, the IMF projections may prove to be inconsistent—
that is, overall import demand may be insufficient to enable the
world’s economies to achieve the growth rates projected.
To estimate the impact of an export-led growth policy
intended to reduce the US current account deficit, we ran a
simulation in which we assumed a 10 percent devaluation of
the dollar relative to a basket of currencies. Figure 3 shows the
three US financial balances (which, by accounting identity,
must sum to zero) and how each balance would change rela-
tive to a baseline in which the value of the dollar was held con-
stant through the end of the simulation period in the fourth
quarter of 2016. The uppermost line in the figure corresponds
to a simulated path for the current account balance. Following
Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 3
a one-time depreciation beginning next quarter, the line rises
throughout the simulation period but never surpasses +1.5
percent of GDP at any point. As we will see in a later section,
our baseline analysis shows that a far larger impetus to growth
is required to restore the economy to health.
Turning to the domestic private sector, signs of hope do
not abound even in markets for products such as paper tow-
els, wheat, and automobiles, although consumption is now
growing again in real terms. Figure 4 depicts the percent change
in consumption, personal disposable income, and wages, all
measured at constant prices and at an annual growth rate. It
is interesting to note that the effects of fiscal stimulus, in both
the 2001–02 recession and the recent Great Recession, are vis-
ible in the figure when disposable income—sustained by net
transfers  from  the  public  sector—grows  faster  than  wages.
The figure also marks the end of each of these two episodes,
with accelerating wage and disposable-income growth begin-
ning in 2003 and 2010. It is also evident that the effects of the
recent stimulus are now over, and with both real wages and
real disposable income stagnant in real terms, the increase in
consumption  will  either  be  temporarily  sustained  by  an
increase in borrowing or possibly revised downwards with the
next, “final” release of GDP data from the BEA.
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Some domestic demand growth may come from nonres-
idential investment. As shown in Figure 5, an increase in prof-
its in the nonfinancial business sector is usually followed by
an increase in investment, with a high correlation after a lag of
about six quarters. We therefore expect that the recent strong
surge in profits in this sector will sooner or later show up in
investment, which has started to pick up already. On the other
hand, profits in the financial industry have recovered from the
Great Recession and the financial crisis, but the correlation
between profits in this sector and gross investment is very
small. We therefore expect no net contribution to aggregate
demand growth from the financial sector, even if the major
US banks manage to emerge from the eurozone sovereign-
debt crisis in relatively good shape.
The lack of strong growth in demand has kept unem-
ployment at high levels since early 2009. The ratio of employed
people to the total population remains well below the levels that
were first reached as women entered the labor force in large
numbers in the 1970s and 1980s (Figure 6). Results from the
government’s most recent (September) Job Openings and Labor
Turnover Survey show that there are about 3.4 million available
jobs (BLS 2011b), while 12.6 million Americans (5.6 million
women and 6.9 million men) reported to the Census Bureau
that they were completely unemployed and looking for work in
November (BLS 2011a). In that month, more than 5.6 million
people  had  been  looking  for  work  for  27  weeks  or  more.
Another 8.3 million were working part-time rather than full-
time for economic reasons.
Meanwhile, the sudden intensification of the euro debt
crisis in November led to an abrupt deterioration in con-
sumer sentiment and ripple effects in the domestic financial
sector. All of these developments have helped elicit more pes-
simistic US economic forecasts from all quarters.
Given  this  bleak  situation  in  industries  that  must  sell
their products to paying customers either at home or abroad,
further fiscal stimulus is in order. But as in Europe, a particu-
larly ill-timed round of fiscal austerity seems to be in prospect.
In fact, as a result, Washington may be in a situation as per-
ilous as the one that President Roosevelt faced in 1937–38
(Bartlett 2011; Krugman 2010). To wit, the lead-up to the
recession  in  those  years  began  with  a  political  defeat  not
unlike the one suffered by congressional Democrats in 2010’s
off-year election.
In 1936, having waged a bruising and largely unsuccess-
ful campaign on behalf of the Democratic Congress, Roosevelt
returned to the capital to find a more conservative mood. His
treasury secretary was advising sharp cuts in the deficit. It
appeared that strong growth had gained momentum, and the
financial and business establishment was anxious to put an
end to what it regarded as dangerous overspending. What fol-
lowed was a cut in government stimulus that could not have
been more decisive. The deficit, which had sharply increased
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Employmentduring Roosevelt’s first four-year term, plunged because of
deliberate  and  untimely  policy  actions.  Specifically,  federal
spending was cut by about 7 percent in 1937 and 11 percent
in 1938, while the introduction of payroll taxes for the new
Social Security program resulted in a tax revenue increase of
38 percent in 1937 and 24 percent the following year. The
ensuing rise in the government balance led, predictably, to a
new recession within the Great Depression, with growth turn-
ing negative in 1938.
Within a similarly hostile political setting, President Obama
was forced in July to agree to a set of automatic cuts to discre-
tionary spending amounting to a total of $1.2 trillion over a 10-
year period. These cuts were to go into effect if the congressional
“supercommittee” failed to come up with deficit reductions of a
similar size and secure their approval by Congress and the pres-
ident. With the supercommittee deadlocked over the appropri-
ate choice of spending cuts and tax increases, the automatic cuts
will begin to go into effect in January 2013, probably resulting in
massive layoffs of federal government workers.
Obama’s most recent stimulus proposal—which amounted
to $447 billion in deficit-neutral changes to taxes and spend-
ing  programs—foundered  on  the  congressional  rocks.  The
plan contained provisions for cutting corporate subsidies and
reforming the tax code that lent credibility to the administra-
tion’s description of the bill as deficit-neutral. In other words,
if passed without amendment, the bill would have paid for
itself. Keynesian theory suggests that the multiplier for new
spending that is exactly matched with new taxes is equal to one.
This means that $1 in new spending coupled with $1 in new
taxes raises overall GDP by $1. This plan has unfortunately
failed in Congress, where Republicans continue to insist on cuts
for larger businesses and wealthy taxpayers, as well as a virtual
ban on new spending. Only a few, relatively minor provisions in
the bill have made it through Congress so far.
Similarly, the main economic proposals offered by the
Republican  presidential  candidates  purport  to  be “revenue
neutral,” leaving the deficit unaffected once both tax cuts and
increases are taken into account. The candidates’ plans for flat
taxes, sales taxes, and other “tax reforms” would further tilt
the burden of taxation toward the middle and lower classes.
Their positions tend toward cutting spending above all else,
regardless of the state of the economy and the labor market,
and their speeches hold out little hope that this anti-Keynesian
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approach would usher in prosperity or help the country grow
stronger in any other way. Rather, they rail against govern-
ment interference and the government’s purportedly illegiti-
mate use of money for what the candidates inevitably regard
as frivolous expenditures. This emphasis contrasts with the
substance of the new American Jobs Act, which includes prac-
tical and simple approaches such as providing funds to help
localities avoid cutting police, firefighters, and teachers from
their payrolls (White House 2011).
But  many  groundbreaking  and  major  projects  also
remain undone, and they need to be done as soon as possible.
One only has to think of the nation’s potholed roads and mea-
ger disaster preparations to see that stimulus spending need
not be spending for spending’s sake, or for the enrichment of
an “elite.” The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)
tracks the nation’s efforts to keep ahead of the decay of its
bridges, roads, pipelines, drinking water systems, et cetera. In its
latest report, the ASCE (2009) gave US infrastructure low rat-
ings once again. Only one category—energy—has improved its
mark since 2005, and even this rating is a subpar D+. As one
example  of  the ASCE’s  concerns,  the  report  estimated  the
nation’s five-year shortfall in public infrastructure spending
at nearly $550 billion in the roads and bridges category alone. 
Figure 7 shows that the United States has lagged behind
most industrialized countries in this regard. In other words,
we are high on the list of countries that have directed the most
resources toward boosting individual consumption and pri-
vate  investment  rather  than  constructing  and  maintaining
long-lasting public goods. The need for improved and better-
maintained  infrastructure  is  seemingly  evident  to  almost
everyone but the various political candidates vying to establish
their conservative bona fides in the struggle for the Republican
presidential nomination.
As a final example, how about investments in care work?
This  term  refers  to  labor-intensive  services  such  as  home
health care, preschool, and day care for children. Simply scal-
ing up a number of existing federal, state, and local govern-
ment  programs  could  create  new  jobs  in  this  area.  These
include Head Start, which has never been fully funded; and
home-based care provided by Medicaid, which unfortunately
has lost its funding in some states. (See Antonopoulos et al.
2010 and Kim and Antonopoulos 2011.)6 Strategic Analysis, December 2011
Thus, Keynesian stimulus need not involve make-work,
though simply putting people to work is relevant any time
there is a large supply of available and even desperate workers.
Rather, infrastructure work answers an important long-term
need. Also, researchers and ordinary Americans don’t have to
look hard to find families in their own localities who badly need
help with child care, health care, and other labor-intensive
care work.
Right-wing economists claim to be able to show that the
government spending multiplier is less than one—even when
selling bonds pays for the spending involved. Figures cited in
some of their opinion pieces in the press purport to show that
a $100 increase in government spending would decrease GDP,
or at best increase it by a few dollars (Barro 2011). Figures of
this type tend to be repeated in the media, but they lack a solid
basis in fact and logic.
It can be put no more plainly than by Princeton econo-
mist Alan Blinder in a recent newspaper article: “In sum, you
may view any particular public-spending program as waste-
ful, inefficient, leading to ‘big government’ or objectionable
on some other grounds. But if it’s not financed with higher
taxes, and if it doesn’t drive up interest rates, it’s hard to see
how it can destroy jobs” (2011). By definition, when the gov-
ernment hires people to work in the public sector or buys
goods  from  the  private  sector,  it  is  undertaking  economic
activity that counts as part of officially measured GDP. As
long as these activities do not cause the business sector to
reduce its total output of goods and services, they will imme-
diately increase GDP at least dollar-for-dollar as government
spending increases.
Moreover, it is hard to escape the conclusion that govern-
ment spending has an additional “multiplier” effect. Namely,
people who are hired by the government or by government
contractors tend to contribute most of their paychecks toward
household purchases, broadly defined. Hence, one would tend
to assume that the effects on GDP of a $100 increase in gov-
ernment spending would be a multiple of the original spend-
ing increase. For example, suppose that such a spending increase
leads to a $60 increase in the aftertax income of workers’ house-
holds. The household savings rate in the United States is cur-
rently about 6 percent, and has not been above 10 percent in
the last 20 years. Hence, it seems reasonable to propose that
government workers’ households would save roughly 6 per-
cent of a $60 increase in their paychecks, or $3.60. This would
leave $56.40 for new household purchases. Hence, including
first- and second-round effects, our hypothetical $100 stimulus
would increase GDP by a total of $156.40.
As  suggested  above,  orthodox  economic  theory  some-
times suggests that multiplier effects may be much smaller
than in this example (Barro 2011). Many economists believe
that households tend to save a much higher percentage of
increasesin their incomes than 6 or even 10 percent. They argue
that unless people know their income will remain at an ele-
vated  level  for  a  fairly  long  time,  they  will  increase  their
household expenditures by much less than one dollar for each
dollar of new disposable income. They often use models that
rely upon the existence of a measurable human preference 
to  spread  purchases  out  over  one’s  lifetime.  In  behavioral
studies, such economic theories often prove inadequate as an
Source: OECD
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explanationof observed consumer spending habits. For exam-
ple, many consumers will wait months for a much-anticipated
check to come in the mail before committing the funds repre-
sented by the check toward new purchases.
Many stimulus skeptics have gotten used to the idea that
the Federal Reserve is far better suited than Congress and the
president to deal with a lack of aggregate demand. In other
words,  we  should  just  lower  short-  and  long-term  interest
rates further and wait for the business sector to respond with
increased  investment.  Indeed,  proposals  for  new  types  of
monetary policy stimulus continue to emanate from the acad-
emy, including nominal GDP targeting (Romer 2011). This
would be quite a departure from the Fed’s de facto practice 
of informally targeting an acceptable range of inflation rates
and treating growth as a secondary objective. In general, the 
academic  literature  is  skeptical  of  claims  that  interest  rate
changes substantially affect corporate investment. Hence, it
seems likely that the Fed’s actions are aimed at stocks and at
the housing market, where prices are still falling. Real price
indices for these markets are shown in Figure 8. It is clear
from the figure that the economic progress since the official
end of the last recession relied to a significant extent on a ris-
ing stock market.
Even the business-oriented Fed itself has been pointing out
that in this era of contraction and stagnation, restoring growth
will  require  more  than  readily  accessible  loans—probably
much more. Daniel Tarullo, a Fed governor and member of the
Fed’s policy-setting committee has pointed out that “neither
monetary nor fiscal policy will be able to fill the whole aggre-
gate demand shortfall quickly. But appropriate policies could
surely boost output and employment” (2011, 6). He goes on
to attack the red herring that unemployment is high mostly
because of structural problems in the labor market, such as 
a workforce that is largely ill qualified for work in the key
industries that are still hiring. Such comments are a measure
of the extraordinary seriousness of the current crisis. In fact,
the Fed’s recent pleas for additional stimulus legislation rep-
resent a significant departure from that institution’s usually
cautious fiscal approach. During the past 30 years, the Fed has
done nothing more frequently in congressional hearings than
urge legislators to cut fiscal deficits.
There  are  several  reasons  that  tend  to  justify  Tarullo’s
views on the power of monetary stimulus to awaken the stag-
nant  economy.  First,  nonfinancial  corporations  are  already
sitting on at least $2 trillion in cash. Specifically, the most recent
flow-of-funds data report from the Fed Board of Governors
noted the following assets on the books of non-financial, non-
farm corporate businesses: $84.2 billion in deposits in foreign
countries, $501.8 billion in checking accounts in the United
States, $574.5 billion in time deposits and savings accounts,
$479.7  billion  in  money  market  funds,  $77.0  billion  in 
commercial paper, $46.1 billion in Treasury securities, $15.4
billion in certain other types of federal securities, and $235.5
billion in mutual fund shares (Federal Reserve 2011b).
Second, banks had about $1.5 trillion in excess reserves
on their balance sheets as of early November (Federal Reserve
2011a) and are offering extremely low rates for many kinds of
loans, including mortgages. Third, loan officers are apparently
still  pessimistic  about  the  chances  that  business  borrowers 
will repay their loans on time and with interest, given finan-
cial and economic conditions. In October, fewer loan officers
reported easing their lending standards than in previous months
(Federal Reserve 2011c). Even major Fed policy actions will not
easily change lenders’ minds about the riskiness of lending
during this financial and economic crisis. The data depicted in
Figure 9 suggest that low interest rates and reduced mortgage
lending have lowered the burden of servicing existing house-
hold debt, but an aura of financial caution seems likely to 
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prevail  following  the  trauma  of  the  subprime  crisis.  The
“deleveraging” process has reversed a long rise in household
borrowing,  but  as  seen  in  the  figure,  the  cost  of  servicing
household loans is no lower than it was in the aftermath of the
much milder recessions of the early 1980s and early 1990s.
Once  again,  we  are  reminded  of  the  high  likelihood  that
demand will be weak in the coming months and years in the
absence of increased fiscal stimulus.
Our baseline forecast remains glum.
Following our standard approach for the Strategic Analysis
series, we conducted a baseline simulation based on various
given  conditions,  which  include  official  forecasts  for  the
future path of the deficit and growth in the rest of the world.
The  baseline  forecast  assumes  no  change  in  the  value  of 
the  dollar  and  deficit  levels  consistent  with  the  bipartisan
Congressional Budget Office’s most recent “no change” scenario
(CBO  2011).  Prices  for  oil  and  other  commodities  are
assumed to grow at an annual rate of 2 percent throughout
the simulation period. We also assume that interest rates will
remain at current levels, and posit gradually rising rates of
business and household borrowing.
As shown in Figure 10, the results of our simulation indi-
cate that growth will remain very weak indeed, with a growth
rate hovering a bit above 2 percent in 2012 before falling to
between 1.5 and 2 percent through 2016. Growth of this mag-
nitude does not generate sufficient demand for labor; meas-
ured against our baseline estimate, unemployment will fall
slightly  in  2012  and  then  rise  again,  remaining  somewhat
above 9 percent up to our forecast horizon (see Figure 13).
Figure 10 shows that in our baseline scenario, the general gov-
ernment budget deficit (that of all levels of government com-
bined) falls significantly, while the debt increases, reaching 94
percent of GDP by the end of 2016. The private sector deficit
is now negative, meaning that saving exceeds investment in
that sector. During the simulation period, the absolute size of
this deficit also falls, an outcome that indicates more borrow-
ing and/or less lending by the private sector. Finally, the cur-
rent account balance gradually rises to zero by the endpoint of
the simulation—a rebalancing act that could end with the
economy collapsing anyway.
In other words, if our assumptions hold true, fears of
prolonged stagnation and flat employment are well justified.
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Scenario 1 indicates that the austerity ahead will
only make things worse.
Starting  in  2013,  the  federal  government  will  be  forced  to
implement large budget cuts that will total $1.2 trillion over
10 years. In scenario 1, we modify the assumptions used in
our baseline simulation in order to simulate the effect of new
austerity measures of a similar magnitude. However, we assume
that the spending cuts all occur between the next fiscal year
and the end of our simulation period. Specifically, spending
and net transfers are reduced relative to the baseline, begin-
ning in the fourth quarter of 2012, in amounts that add up to
$1.5 trillion through the end of the simulation period in the
fourth quarter of 2016.
In the case of government spending cuts, the multiplier
effect works in the direction of reducing economic growth
rather than increasing it, relative to the outcome of the base-
line scenario. Hence, growth remains stable at an annual rate
of 2.3–2.8 percent during calendar year 2012, as depicted in
Figure 11. It then falls as low as approximately 0.06 percent in
the second quarter of 2014, before leveling off at around 1
percent for the balance of the simulation period.
The figure also shows the nation’s three financial bal-
ances—government, foreign, and private. In this scenario, the
government  deficit  falls  gradually  to  about  0.2  percent,
reflecting both spending cuts and reductions in revenue that
occur because of lower GDP growth rates. The private sector
deficit also moves fairly steadily toward balance, reaching as
high as –2.6 percent at the end of the simulation period. This
private sector rebalancing is faster than the one in the baseline
scenario, mostly because the government deficit falls more
quickly in this case.
The  total  balance  of  the  two  domestic  sectors,  which
equals the current account balance, moves above 2.4 percent
by  the  end  of  the  simulation  period.  This  reversal  occurs
largely because slow domestic growth tends to reduce imports
relative to exports. It is likely that such a reduction in import
demand would cause severe consequences for economies that
export to the United States—consequences that would rever-
berate among all trading nations, including the US. Not sur-
prisingly, given the sharp expenditure cuts and the lack of a
currency  devaluation  in  this  scenario,  unemployment  gets
worse, rising to 10.7 percent by the fourth quarter of 2016
(again, see Figure 13).
Scenario 2 shows that even a frugal stimulus 
package would be of great help.
In scenario 2, we conduct a fiscal stimulus experiment. The
modest “stimulus package” considered in this exercise is made
up  of  two  components:  (1)  an  extension  of  the  2  percent
reduction in federal payroll taxes that went into effect earlier
this year, and (2) an increase in outlays large enough to yield
a reduction of unemployment to approximately 7 percent by
2016. We determined the appropriate increase in outlays by
starting with the baseline CBO fiscal policy assumptions and
adjusting total government expenditures and transfers until
we found a path that reached the 7 percent unemployment
rate objective in 2016.
Again, we begin our discussion with projected growth
rates. As shown in Figure 12, the additional stimulus assumed
in scenario 2 increases real GDP growth very quickly. Growth
rises to 2.4 percent in the first quarter of 2012 and peaks at 4
percent in the first quarter of 2013. The effect of the stimulus
gradually subsides, causing the growth rate to fall starting in the
first quarter of 2013. Yet the growth rate remains at a reasonably
strong 3 percent even at the end of the simulation period.
The same figure shows that the government deficit declines
fairly  sharply,  despite  the  tax-cut  extension  and  spending
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increase. The projected fourth-quarter 2016 deficit of 6.5 per-
cent of GDP exceeds our baseline but may sound remarkably
low, given the  hysteria about deficits found in much of the
news media. As mentioned earlier, the private sector deficit is
currently negative, reflecting the tendency of households and
businesses to keep spending low as they deleverage from the
excess borrowing of the prerecession boom years. Returning
to Figure 12, we see that our scenario 2 stimulus plan causes
the  private  sector  to  begin  spending  more  and  the  sector
deficit  to  rise,  although  it  remains  below  –4.6  percent
throughout the simulation period.
Finally, the current account balance continues its upward
trend accordingly, beginning with a deficit of 2.9 percent in
the fourth quarter of 2011 and reaching approximately 1.9
percent  by  the  end  of  2016.  These  figures  show  welcome
progress  from  the  much  larger  current  account  deficit  of
around 6.5 percent of GDP run by the United States in the
fourth quarter of 2005, despite the administration of a serious
dose of fiscal stimulus in the interim.
According to our simulation, the stimulus package does
raise the ratio of government debt to GDP, as seen in Figure
14. The increased deficits in this last scenario cause total gov-
ernment debt to rise somewhat relative to our baseline num-
bers, but not by much: 97.4 percent of GDP in scenario 2 ver-
sus 94.4 percent of GDP in the baseline and 91.1 percent in
scenario 1. This difference in the path of the debt-to-GDP
ratio  is  relatively  small,  since  the  assumed  fiscal  stimulus
package has the effect of increasing the denominator of the
ratio as well as its numerator.
Figure 14 Public Debt under Alternative Assumptions
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Figure 13 Unemployment Rate in Three Scenarios
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The impact of a eurozone crisis on US financial
assets could be significant.
Our simulations have been based on the latest IMF projec-
tions for world growth, which do not take into account recent
events in the eurozone. It is thus interesting to evaluate how a
further slowdown, or possibly a financial crisis, in the euro-
zone might affect our simulation results.
The  importance  of  the  euro  area  as  a  market  for  US
exports  has  declined  steadily:  while  it  accounted  for  more
than  24  percent  of  total  US  exports  in  the  1970s,  it  now
accounts for only about 16 percent, while the relative impor-
tance of other (mostly Asian) countries has increased in terms
of US trade. Slower growth in Europe will thus have an impact
on US exports, and therefore on US growth and employment,
but one of limited size.
On the other hand, a financial crisis that affects the value
of US assets held in the eurozone may have a much more sig-
nificant impact on net US financial wealth, which in turn is an
important determinant of private expenditure.
Figure 15 breaks down the total value of US debt securi-
ties (bonds, notes, bills, et cetera) by country of origin, accord-
ing to the latest IMF figures. As seen in the figure, Greece,
Ireland, and Portugal made up a fairly modest slice of US
debt-security portfolios as of 2009. Yet all European economies
are at risk. For example, Italy has been running a budget sur-
plus (not including interest payments of course), but bond
markets have been spurning new securities offerings, leading
to escalating yields on the sovereign debt of that country. And
the UK, which still enjoys the benefits of low interest rates, has
nonetheless been rapidly implementing harsh fiscal austerity
measures,  and  may  already  be  caught  in  a  spiral  of  low
growth,  falling  tax  revenues,  rising  debt,  and  government
spending cuts. As seen in the figure, that country accounts for
more than 20 percent of total debt security holdings in the
United States. So, even though the United States is not directly
holding a large percentage of its financial assets in troubled
eurozone countries, its assets in the UK and other interna-
tional  financial  centers  may  be  significantly  affected  by  a
financial crisis in the euro area. Many of the world’s central
banks have been intervening to lend to these debt markets, in
an effort to prevent a financial collapse. Such a collapse would
threaten the world economy with a crisis perhaps much more
severe than the one that followed the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers in 2008. The US government must take this threat 
far more seriously. It could do no better than to prevent a
national recession that would contribute to a chain reaction of
defaults and misery.
Source: IMF
Figure 15 Total Foreign Debt Securities Held By the
United States, 2009 
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